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VILLANOVA LAw REVIEW
THE SMITH RULE AND A PARTY'S BURDEN OF
COMING FORWARD WHEN RELYING ON
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1959 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Smith v. Bell Tel.
Co.,1 put to rest the conflict in the various rules applied by the different
courts within the Commonwealth and, indeed, the Supreme Court itself,
with regard to a plaintiff's introduction of evidence sufficient to withstand
a motion for compulsory nonsuit2 when attempting to establish his case
by circumstantial evidence. Prior to the Smith decision, there were
basically two rules applied by the courts. Under one rule, in order for
plaintiff's case to withstand a motion for compulsory nonsuit it was
required that the jury be able to draw only one reasonable inference from
the circumstantial evidence presented. The other rule required only that
the inference drawn from a number of possible inferences outweigh the
remaining possible inferences that could have been drawn from the evidence
presented. In Smith the Supreme Court adopted this latter rule.
The general scheme of this comment will be to discuss the Smith
decision and its development in subsequent cases. It should be noted
initially that while the courts repeatedly use the term "burden of proof"
in the Smith line of cases, they are actually referring to a plaintiff's burden
of coming forward with evidence3 sufficient to withstand a motion for
compulsory nonsuit and get his case to the jury.
4
II. CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has defined evidence as:
Any species of proof, or probative material, legally presented at the
trial of an issue, by the act of the parties and through the medium of
witnesses, records, documents, concrete objects, etc., for the purpose
of inducing belief in the minds of the court or jury as to their
contention.3
Circumstantial evidence has been defined to include "all evidence of an
indirect nature, whether the inference afforded by it be drawn from
experience, or by reasoning from the circumstances of a particular case,
1. 397 Pa. 134, 153 A.2d 477 (1959).
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 645 (1953).
3. "There is a difference between burden of proof and the burden of going for-
ward with evidence." McFadden v. Fogelsanger, 62 Dauph. 192, 193 (1951). See also
MacDonald v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 348 Pa. 558, 36 A.2d 492 (1944) ; Zenner v.
Goetz, 324 Pa. 432, 188 Atl. 124 (1936).
4. This becomes apparent upon an examination of how the Smith case arose on
appeal. After the plaintiff had presented his case, the defendant moved for a com-
pulsory nonsuit, which was granted. The case never went to the jury, therefore the
court could not be referring to burden of proof.
5. Commonwealth ex rel. Hendrickson v. Myers, 393 Pa. 224, 228, 144 A.2d 367,
370 (1958) (quoting BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951)).
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or by reason aided by experience." 6 The term "all evidence" when read
against the Supreme Court's definition of evidence indicates that both
real and testimonial evidence may be circumstantial. By "indirect nature"
the courts have in mind testimonial evidence other than eye-witness
testimony concerning the conclusion sought to be established. 7 In other
words, the conclusion sought to be established was not observed by the
witness; instead only some or all of the surrounding circumstances tending
to support the conclusion were observed 8 Real evidence is circumstantial
in nature when it is offered as proof in establishing something more than
the mere existence of the real evidence itself, such as when it is used as
a basis for reasoning to a particular conclusion.
The reasoning process involved in proving a case is probably better
understood if the various elements of the case attempted to be proved
are framed in terms of syllogisms with the major premises comprised or
founded upon matters of general knowledge and experience, 9 and the
minor premises consisting of direct evidence, circumstantial evidence and
propositions formulated from direct or circumstantial evidence or both.
The conclusions of the syllogisms would be the conclusions necessary to
the disposition of the case. It should be kept clearly in mind that most
circumstantial evidentiary facts must first be established by direct evidence
in the form of eye-witness testimony or by the introduction of real
evidence. 10 However, there is a possibility that a proposition or conclusion
offered to circumstantially establish an ultimate conclusion in a case was
initially a conclusion which itself was established either in whole or in
part by circumstantial evidence." In effect, there are series or plateaus of
syllogisms reaching to the ultimate conclusion of a case.
III. Smith v. Bell Tel. Co.
In 1948 defendant Counties Contracting & Construction Company
constructed an underground conduit to carry telephone lines pursuant to
a contract with defendant Bell Telephone Company. The conduit was
laid beneath the sidewalk of a home which the plaintiff purchased two
years later. Smith discovered seepage in the basement of his home
6. 1 HENRY, PENNSYLVANIA EVIDENCE § 8, at 14 (4th ed. 1953).
7. In Ebersole v. Beistline, 368 Pa. 12, 17, 82 A.2d 11, 13 (1951), the court
stated that: "Proof of negligence may be furnished by the circumstances themselves
and it is not essential to have eye-witness testimony, but where the circumstantial
evidence is offered because direct proof is not available...." (Emphasis added.)
It is clear that the court is equating direct evidence to eye-witness testimony. See
1 WIGMORE, EvIDXNCE § 25, at 390-401 (3d ed. 1940).
8. 1 WiGMORE, EvIDNCS § 25, at 398 (3d ed. 1940).
9. An inference is: "A process of reasoning by which a fact or proposition sought
to be established is deduced as a logical consequence from other facts, or a state of
facts, already proved or admitted." Simon v. Fine, 167 Pa. Super. 386, 391, 74 A.2d
674, 676 (1950) (quoting BLACK, LAW DIcTIONARY (4th ed. 1951)). Accord, Watkins
v. Prudential Ins. Co., 315 Pa. 497, 173 At. 644 (1934) ; Stevenson v. Stewart, 11
Pa. 307 (1849).
10. 1 WIGMORE, EviDeNCE § 25, at 400 (3d ed. 1940).
11. The risk that is run here is an objection to an inference upon an inference.
Cantwell v. Bristol Township, 412 Pa. 469, 194 A.2d 922 (1963).
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shortly after taking occupancy. In attempting to find the cause of the
seepage, he tunneled under the sidewalk and found "that the telephone
conduit had crushed the sewer lateral and was blocking it.' ' 12 In an action
to recover for the damages to his property, the plaintiff introduced testi-
mony to the effect that piers (supports) are normally placed under the
conduits when they cross above other pipes to keep the conduit from
settling and crushing the pipes beneath. Smith testified that, in tunneling
under the sidewalk, he found no materials to indicate that supports had
been placed under the conduit. However, no direct evidence was intro-
dued to show that piers had not been constructed.13 Defendant's motion
for compulsory nonsuit was granted and the plaintiff appealed.
In support of the nonsuit the lower court applied the rule that, "where
plaintiff's case is based on circumstantial evidence and inferences to be
drawn therefrom, such evidence must be so conclusive as to exclude any
other reasonable inference inconsistent therewith .... -14 The court con-
cluded that while the plaintiff had established the occurrence of an
accident, "the best that could be said for plaintiff's case was that 'the
collapse of the conduit may have been the consequence of defendant's
negligence.' "15 Since the collapse of the conduit could have been due to
factors other than defendant's negligence, plaintiff had failed to meet his
burden of coming forward with sufficient evidence to withstand a motion
for compulsory nonsuit. The Supreme Court disagreed with the trial
court's conclusion, stating that the proper test to be applied is:
[W]hen a party who has the burden of proof relies upon circum-
stantial evidence and inferences reasonably deducible therefrom, such
evidence, in order to prevail, must be adequate to establish the con-
clusion sought and must so preponderate in favor of that conclusion
as to outweigh in the mind of the fact-finder any other evidence and
reasonable inferences therefrom which are inconsistent therewith.' 6
The basic distinction between the lower court's test and the test
adopted by the Supreme Court is that under the former, evidence introduced
must lead conclusively to only one inference and result in only one conclu-
sion, while under the latter test, the evidence must preponderate in favor
of the inference sought so as to outweigh any other reasonable inference
that is inconsistent with it. As the court aptly points out, if the lower
court's formula were the rule, "what would be the province of the jury?
In no case where there was more than one reasonable inference would
the jury be permitted to decide.' i7 This language clearly indicates that,
12. Smith v. Bell Tel. Co., 397 Pa. 134, 136, 153 A.2d 477, 479 (1959).
13. No such evidence appears in the court's opinion. It would seem that if there
were any such evidence, the defendant would have introduced it, and the court would
surely have mentioned it.
14. Smith v. Bell Tel. Co., 397 Pa. 134, 136, 153 A.2d 477, 479 (1959).
15. Id. at 139, 153 A.2d at 480.
16. Ibid. In so doing, the court overruled many prior cases. See 397 Pa. at 137,
153 A.2d at 477.
17. Smith v. Bell Tel. Co., 397 Pa. 134, 137, 153 A.2d 477, 479 (1959).
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while the court uses the phrase "burden of proof," it is in fact referring
to plaintiff's burden of coming forward.
The initial determination as to whether the plaintiff has met his burden
of coming forward is made by the judge when he decides whether to sus-
tain or overrule the defendant's motion for a compulsory nonsuit.' 8 In
reaching this decision he must determine whether a reasonable jury could
find that the inference plaintiff seeks to establish is more probable than
the other inferences which might be drawn from the evidence presented.
The "only reasonable inference" rule appeared to be an attempt on the
part of the courts to keep a case from reaching a jury where a choice
had to be made between several plausible inferences. As such, -the rule
reflected a certain distrust of a jury's ability to choose wisely, a distrust
which was remedied at the expense of plaintiff's case. The Smith rule has
struck a middle ground. The court still retains the right to decide whether
a case is to get to a jury, but the plaintiff does not have to exclude all
but one reasonable inference. The resultant rule indicates a greater,
although not complete, trust of a jury's ability and, at the same time,
indicates a more liberal approach toward the plaintiff's burden of coming
forward with the evidence.
In analyzing the problem posed in Smith, the court stated that it was
"not... faced with a case relying on circumstantial evidence to show both
the happening of the accident and the defendant's negligence. It is clear that
the injury was caused by the conduit crushing the sewer lateral."'19 It
follows from the court's use of the word "both" that either defendant's
negligence or the cause of the damage to plaintiff's property was estab-
lished20 circumstantially. 21 Since the court concluded that defendant's
negligence was established circumstantially, it must have been of the
opinion that the cause was established by direct evidence. This conclusion
is incorrect. Since the plaintiff did not actually see the conduit crush the
sewer, that fact could only be established indirectly by testimony as to
the circumstances as viewed by him in digging around the sewer and
conduit. Such evidence would be indirect since one could not reason
directly from it to the conclusion that the conduit crushed the sewer
without going through a syllogistic reasoning process. The minor premise
would be that the conduit was on the sewer and the sewer was crushed.
The major premise, derived from knowledge and experience, would be
that when an object is found lying on another object which is crushed,
and the object was not crushed before being placed beneath the ground,
the former object was probably the cause of the latter being crushed.
18. Mr. Justice Bell in his concurring opinion in the Smith case states that"whether the evidence, if believed, is legally sufficient to satisfy this test is in the
first instance for the Court's determination .. " Id. at 144, 153 A.2d at 482.
19. Smith v. Bell Tel. Co., 397 Pa. 134, 139, 153 A.2d 477, 480 (1959).
20. The word "established" as employed in this situation means that the plaintiff
came forward with enough evidence to withstand a motion for compulsory nonsuit.
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The conclusion would be that the conduit crushed the sewer. The court
appears to overlook this process of reasoning in arriving at the same con-
clusion.
Turning to the other elements of plaintiff's case, it is apparent that
the plaintiff established defendant's negligence by circumstantial evidence.
Plaintiff could only testify with regard to the circumstances existing at
the time he dug around the conduit, and there is no indication in the
opinion that he called any workman to testify with regard to whether
they installed or saw installed any supports under the conduit. Therefore,
it seems fair to conclude that plaintiff introduced no direct evidence as
to defendant's negligence, but established it solely by circumstantial evi-
dence. It should be noted that the plaintiff did not establish that there were
no supports under the conduit at the time of the accident by direct evidence.
Before proceeding to an analysis of the cases decided subsequent to
Smith, the court's statement that circumstantial evidence was not employed
to show both the happening of the accident and defendant's negligence
2
1
is worth noting again in a different light. It has already been pointed out
that the jury had to rely on circumstantial evidence to prove the cause of
injury. The point to be raised here is whether the court is limiting the
rule established in Smith to those situations where the cause of injury is
established by direct evidence only. The language of the opinion suggests
that such a limitation was intended.
IV. SUBSEQUENT CASES
A discussion of Johnston v. Dick23 is helpful for an understanding of
what is not sufficient to meet the requirements of the Smith rule. Plaintiff
Johnston, an employee of the State Highway Department, was severely
injured on October 3, 1956, between 4:30 P.M. and 5:00 P.M., when a
kerosene lantern he was lighting to mark the presence of road construction
exploded. It was later established that the lantern did not contain kerosene
but a mixture of kerosene and gasoline. The mixture came from the
Highway Department's maintenance barn. There were four pumps at the
barn: one for diesel oil, one for kerosene and two for gasoline The
attendant at the garage testified that he filled plaintiff's filling can from
the second, or kerosene tank. The mixture in that tank proved to be
explosive. The Highway Department records showed a delivery of kerosene
on October 2 between 2 and 6 A.M. from Sherer Oil Company, additional
defendant, by Carmen Dick, the defendant, and a delivery of gasoline by
the Atlantic Refining Company on October 3 between 8 and 10 P.M.
Dick denied delivering anything but kerosene. The testimony at trial
indicated that no one was on duty at the maintenance barn from 4 P.M.
October 2 to 4 P.M. October 3. The jury returned a verdict for the
plaintiff but the trial court granted the defendant's motion for a judgment
22. See note 19 supra.
23. 401 Pa. 637, 165 A.2d 634 (1960).
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non obstante verdicto. On appeal the plaintiff contended that the Smith
rule should have been applied to overrule the defendant's motion. The
Supreme Court rejected this argument, asserting that, "The trouble with
this reference is that plaintiff is not offering circumstantial evidence in
the instant case but only circumstantial supposition .... 24 To reason from
the fact that there was an explosive mixture and conclude that Dick de-
livered that mixture is to beg the question, since such reasoning must be
based initially on the premise that any explosive mixture delivered was
delivered by Dick. That is precisely what the plaintiff was attempting to
prove. It could not be assumed, and there was no justification for it
based on knowledge and experience. The court stated: "The best that
plaintiff has done is to suppose that defendant may have done all manner
of negligent things, without any evidence, direct or circumstantial, that he
actually did any of them.' 25 In other words, for the jury to conclude that
Dick delivered the mixture would be simply a guess on their part.
26
One of the first cases decided subsequent to Smith, Lear v. Shirk's
Motor Express Co.,2 7 involved an action to recover for personal injuries
suffered in a collision. The case is important for several reasons. First,
the rule enunciated in Smith was applied to defendant's burden of coming
forward with evidence when attempting to establish plaintiff's contributory
negligence. 28  This extension was logical and expected since the elements
of contributory negligence are essentially the same as those required for a
plaintiff to get his case to the jury. A second point to be noted is the
application of the Smith rule to a personal injury action.29 In Shearer v.
Insurance Co. of North America,30 the Smith rule was applied to an action
in assumpsit as a standard for determining whether plaintiff had met his
burden of proof.3 1 Defendant insurer refused to pay plaintiffs' claim for
damages allegedly caused by an explosion, arguing that the damage suffered
was not caused by an explosion but by subsidence, a peril not covered by
the policy. The plaintiffs contended that the cracks in the walls and the
settling of the home were caused by "retreat operations"3 2 in mines located
24. Id. at 643, 165 A.2d at 637.
25. Id. at 644, 165 A.2d at 637. Other cases in which plaintiff has been denied
recovery under the Smith rule are: Puskarich v. Trustees of Zembo Temple, 412 Pa.
313, 194 A.2d 208 (1963) ; Davies v. McDowell Nat'l Bank, 22 Pa. D.&C.2d 692, aff'd,
407 Pa. 209, 180 A.2d 21 (1962).
26. The court has consistently held that the jury may not be permitted to guess
or speculate. See Schofield v. King, 388 Pa. 132, 130 A.2d 93 (1957) (overruled on
other grounds).
27. 397 Pa. 144, 152 A.2d 883 (1959).
28. Id. at 151, 152 A.2d at 887.
29. Johnston v. Dick, supra, also involved a personal injury action. However,
Shirk seems to be the first personal injury action to which the Smith rule was applied.
30. 397 Pa. 566, 156 A.2d 182 (1959).
31. In Shearer defendant appealed from the denial of two motions: a motion for
judgment non obstante verdicto and a motion for a new trial. The court considered
and passed on both motions. In considering the latter motion the court used the Smith
rule to determine whether plaintiff had met his burden of proof.
32. Apparently, when mining for coal one method of supporting the ceiling of the
mine is to leave pillars of coal behind you as you proceed forward. When the mine is
worked through, the miners remove the pillars as they leave the mine by blasting.
Id. at 569, 156 A.2d at 184.
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directly beneath their home. Expert testimony relating to the elements of
cause and causal connection, and testimony to the effect that windows
rattled and that loud "explosion-like sounds" were heard"8 was introduced
by the plaintiffs in attempting to show that their property damage had
resulted from an explosion.
The interesting aspect of Shearer lies in the court's use of the Smith
rule as a standard for measuring burden of proof. Shearer involved a
situation in which the case had gone to the jury, and the court was asked
to evaluate its decision in terms of the preponderance of the evidence. The
language of the Smith rule is amenable to such application. In fact,
Shearer dearly reveals that such language is applicable to two aspects of
the plaintiff's case. The language concerning more than one inference has
reference to the burden of coming forward with evidence, while the lan-
guage concerning the preponderance of one inference over another deals
with the plaintiff's burden of proof.
The Smith rule is usually applied where the plaintiff has established all
of the elements of his case by direct evidence, with the exception of de-
fendant's negligence. In the case of Finny v. G. C. Murphy Co.,8 4 plaintiff
slipped on a large quantity of oil and fell on defendant's floor. She con-
tended that the oil was the excess remaining after defendant had oiled
its floors, but no direct evidence was introduced to show that the oil she
slipped on was of the same type that defendant used on its floors, nor
that defendant had placed it there. The only evidence offered on this
point was testimony to the effect that the floors looked newly oiled. The
plaintiff did establish by direct testimony, however, that the large quantity
of oil she saw beneath her feet as she fell had caused her to fall. The
court reversed a nonsuit stating that under the Smith test defendant's
negligence was a question for the jury.
An interesting case, factually, is that of Bocchicchio v. Curtis Pub-
lishing Co.,88 dealing with a libel action brought by Felix Bocchicchio,
"Jersey Joe" Walcott's manager. The action grew out of an article pub-
lished by Curtis concerning the Marciano-Walcott fight which stated that
Bocchicchio had allegedly rubbed capscium vaseline on Walcott's body and
gloves, intending that it should get into Marciano's eyes and impair his
vision during the fight. The court, after reviewing the evidence presented
with regard to the truth of the statement, made reference to the Smith
rule and asserted its applicability to the area of libel.36
33. Id. at 572, 156 A.2d at 184.
34. 406 Pa. 555, 178 A.2d 719 (1962). Accord, Lewis v. United States Rubber
Co., 414 Pa. 626, 202 A.2d 20 (1964) ; Flagiello v. Crilly, 409 Pa. 389, 187 A.2d 289
1963) ; Riesberg v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R., 407 Pa. 434 (1962) ; Hartigan v.
lark, 401 Pa. 594, 165 A.2d 647 (1960) ; Geiger v. Schneyer, 398 Pa. 69, 157 A.2d 56
(1959) ; Sechrist v. Consolidated Market House of Lebanon, 203 Pa. Super. 271, 199
A.2d 538 (1964); Graham v. Sieger, 196 Pa. Super. 622, 176 A.2d 457 (1961);
Donovan v. Philadelphia Parking Authority, 24 Pa. D.&C.2d 686 (Munic. Ct., Phila.
Co.), aff'd per curiam, 196 Pa. Super. 90, 173 A.2d 667 (1961) ; Actman v. Zubrow,
191 Pa. Super. 516, 159 A.2d 30 (1960).
35. 203 F. Supp. 403 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
36. Id. at 410.
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V. SOME SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES
37
In Lear v. Shirk's Motor Express Co., discussed previously, the court
averted to a special situation in which the "only reasonable inference"
rule,38 rejected in Smith, still has vitality. This situation arises where the
trial judge finds that a party is contributorially negligent as a matter
of law on the basis of that party's own testimony. If the evidence presented
at trial leads to only one conclusion, the jury could not help but reach
that conclusion. They may, in the usual situation, reject a conclusion
on the basis of the party's credibility, but there can be no issue of credibility
with regard to a party's statement against himself,3 9 and the conclusion
must stand.
In Cuthbert v. City of Philadelphia,40 plaintiff brought an action for
injuries suffered when she tripped while crossing a street. Mrs. Cuthbert
could not testify that she actually saw what caused her to trip at the
time of her fall, but she did testify that she returned to the scene and
found a depression in the street which she alleged was the cause of her
tripping. The Supreme Court reversed a judgment for the plaintiff, hold-
ing that she had failed to prove causal connection as a matter of law.
The court pointed out that, even if one of the defendants had been negli-
gent in allowing the depression to remain unattended, 4' it was just as
reasonable to infer that plaintiff had tripped over the trolley tracks located
in the area where she fell. If that were the case, she could not recover
from the defendants. 42 A possible distinction between the Smith and
Cuthbert cases appears to lie in the fact that in Cuthbert there was direct
evidence as to two instrumentalities that could have possibly caused the
injury, the depression and the trolley rail, while in Smith, there was direct
evidence as to only one possible instrumentality that could have caused the
injury, the conduit. Holding this distinction in abeyance for a moment,
a case one step further removed from Smith than Cuthbert, in terms of
this distinction, is the case of Cantwell v. Bristol Township.43 In Cantwell
plaintiff was seriously injured when he dove into a reservoir. There was
circumstantial evidence that he had hit his head on something, but there
was no direct evidence introduced as to the identity of that something.
The Supreme Court quoted the lower court, asserting that, "without any
direct evidence of an obstacle, the jury could not be permitted to infer
the existence of such an obstacle, and upon such inference base the further
inference that, that was what plaintiff struck ....
37. While investigating these possible situations it might be worth while to keep
in mind the distinction alluded to in the Smith case to the effect that, "we are not
here faced with a case relying on circumstantial evidence to show both the happening
of the accident and defendant's negligence." See note 19 supra.
38. See note 28 supra.
39. Ibid.
40. 417 Pa. 610, 209 A.2d 261 (1965).
41. Id. at 613, 209 A.2d at 263.
42. Id. at 616, 209 A.2d at 264.
43. 412 Pa. 469, 194 A.2d 922 (1963).
44. Id. at 470.
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There are, therefore, three possibilities with regard to the instru-
mentality causing an injury: first, the situation where there is no direct
evidence as to the instrumentality causing the injury (Cantwell); second,
the situation where there is direct evidence as to two or more instru-
mentalities that could have caused the injury (Cuthbert); and third, the
situation where there is only direct evidence as to one instrumentality which
could have possibly caused the injury (Smith). In the first and possibly
the second instance, the court will rule as a matter of law that the plaintiff
has not met his burden of coming forward with the evidence under the
Smith rule. This may have been what the court was driving at in Smith
when it said that "we are not here faced with a case relying on circum-
stantial evidence to show both the happening of the accident and the
defendant's negligence. ' 45 The court could be equating the happening of the
accident with its cause, or more particularly, with the instrumentality
that possibly caused the injury. If this is so, Smith may be limited in
application to those situations where there is direct evidence on the record
of at least one instrumentality that could have caused the injury. The
language from Cantwell quoted above lends some support to this conten-
tion. If there is direct evidence as to more than one instrumentality, and
one or more of them could have caused the injury, additional evidence must
be presented so that the jury can reach a decision as to which instrumen-
tality was actually involved.
46
It will be remembered that in Smith the court did not consider the
plaintiff's failure to establish the circumstances existing at the time of the
accident by direct evidence. It would seem that the liberalization of the
test for determining whether plaintiff has met his burden of coming for-
ward with the evidence, when viewed in light of the fact that the court
did not consider this requirement in Smith, would result in a relaxation
of this requirement. However, such has not been the case, 47 for the courts
will at different times inject a "condition at the time of injury" requirement




In Smith v. Bell Tel. Co., the court rejected the "only reasonable
inference" test in favor of a more liberal test for determining whether
a plaintiff has met his burden of coming forward with evidence sufficient
to withstand a motion for a compulsory nonsuit when he relies on circum-
45. Smith v. Bell Tel. Co., 397 Pa. 134, 153 A.2d 477, 480 (1959).
46. If this were not so the jury would only be guessing as to which instrumentality
was the cause of the injury. See note 26 supra.
47. In the case of Steiner v. Pittsburgh Ry., the court states that, "there was no
proof that these facts existed at the time of the death or caused or had any connection
with decedent's death." 415 Pa. 549, 551, 204 A.2d 254, 255 (1964).
48. It seems that this requirement and its application is largely within the dis-
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stantial evidence to establish his case. That case involved an action to
recover for property damage resulting from defendant's negligence. The
Smith test has since been applied in landlord-tenant situations, 49 personal
injury cases, actions in assumpsit, actions in libel, and to defendant's burden
of coming forward with evidence in establishing contributory negligence.
The test may, however, be subject to certain exceptions. The courts seem
to imply that there are situations where a plaintiff cannot meet his burden
by relying on circumstantial evidence alone. For example, direct proof
may be required as to the instrumentality that caused injury. A less
predictable situation is presented where the court requires the circum-
stances existing at the time of the injury to be established by direct evi-
dence. The Smith decision has not excluded the application of the "only
reasonable inference" test altogether. That test still has validity in those
instances where a party indicates his contributory negligence by his own
statements; but it is apparent from the discussion above that the Smith
test will be increasingly applied to cases in different areas of civil liability,
and that juries will play a greater role in deciding these cases.
Paul A. Kiefer
49. Gaynor v. Nagob, 204 Pa. Super. 265, 203 A.2d 358 (1964) ; Sechrist v. Con-
solidated Market House of Lebanon, 203 Pa. Super. 271, 199 A.2d 538 (1964) ; Graham
v. Sieger, 196 Pa. Super. 622, 176 A.2d 457 (1961) ; Actman v. Zubrow, 191 Pa. Super.
516, 159 A.2d 30 (1960).
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